Yesterday, Don Mattingly had what I call a “Wu-Tang moment”, inspired by the “When Keeping It Real Goes Wrong” skit on Chappelle’s Show.

Humorous? Yes, but what it mean to me is that Mattingly basically dropped all the fronts and simply went in on the Dodgers players and front office in surprisingly pointed comments.

“We’re in last place in the National League West,” the skipper said. “Last year at this point, we played a lineup with nobody in it, but they fought, they competed and battled every inch. I felt like we got more out of our ability. I don’t know if that team was tougher. I don’t know why and it was only for a short period of time.

“Part of it is the mixture of competitiveness. It’s not just putting an All-Star team out there and the All-Star team wins. You try to find that balance of a team that’s got a little grit and fight, and has enough talent to get there also. It’s not all grit and not talent that gets there, and it’s not all talent and no grit. It’s a mixture of both.”
Mattingly wouldn’t say Ethier was guilty of anything. Instead, the manager said what he’s looking for.

“There’s a touch of a difference between saying you’re giving your best effort and you’re willing to fight for something,” Mattingly said. “Some guys go to another level for that price, will do whatever it takes to win a game … that inside, you’re not beating me today. There’s something there you can’t measure with Sabermetrics. You can’t put a number on it.”

The media expected saber-friendly bloggers like myself to be offended by his comments, but I don’t necessarily disagree with him. Yes, “grit” is practically a meme amongst bloggers, but his points about focus and effort and what not are all part of the evaluation process, and it’s the job of the manager and front office to get the best out of their players in anyway they can.

If this is part of it, then so be it. But it remains to be see if it’ll actually be an effective tactic or not.

—–

A lot of focus was put on Mattingly’s comments and how they related to Andre Ethier, who was benched against a right-hander and called out by Mattingly.

“For me, today, I’m putting out my lineup that I feel is going to be the most competitive and going to compete the hardest,” he said.

Asked if Ethier is no longer a player he automatically writes into the lineup every day, Mattingly said, “Well, he wasn’t today.”

Does Mattingly think Ethier won’t fight?

“I can’t really say that,” he said. “I don’t really want to say that, but we’ve got to compete.”

Asked if he was dissatisfied with Ethier’s toughness and mental approach, Mattingly said, “I want to put a club out there that I think for the long range that you can trust, that’s going to fight and compete the whole day.”

Has Mattingly not seen that from Ethier at times?

“Anything like that would need to be a conversation in-house,” he said.

Mattingly said he has had several conversations with Ethier about this over the years. After the 2011 season, Mattingly estimated that Ethier gave away 100 at-bats because of his inability to control his emotions. Asked if Ethier still had similar issues, Mattingly said, “Yeah, at times.”

Remember that hilarious stare-down from the other day? As funny as that was, it was a prime example of him giving away an at-bat (and his spot on team for the rest of that game), which may be part of the reason for this outburst. Either way, it’s certainly an example of what Mattingly is talking about.

Ethier, for his part, took the high road.

“Yeah, I take offense to that, without approaching me first,” said Ethier. “Other than that, I show up every day and find ways to compete, to work hard whether I’m going good or bad. Just like everyone here, I have to get a grip and a handle on what’s gone on. We can never lose hope to get back on top of the division. That’s my approach every day.”

“I don’t think there’s ever a question,” he said. “I made a commitment to what we’re doing. We all have tough times. We just have got to figure out what’s going on and battle through it. Quitting is not an option.”

People reading these comments and then citing Ethier’s stat line in comparison with Matt Kemp and others are sort of missing the boat on this, I think.

Normally, I wouldn’t support this kind of stuff, but I think this situation is more nuanced than “Ethier hitting now, so Mattingly dumb”, as it’s not just Mattingly that doesn’t support Ethier.

Over the years, basically everybody I’ve talked to that’s been close to the team has not exactly come away with a glowing impression of Ethier, and it wasn’t Mattingly that tried to eat the contract of a recently-extended Ethier just this past winter.

Mike Petriello affirms the same general feeling about Ethier, as well as the trade aspect of it.

I don’t know what happened with Ethier behind the scenes, though anyone surprised that he’s got a reputation as being difficult hasn’t been paying attention — and yes, they did try to trade him over the winter.

So while I’m not all that sure what happened behind closed doors, and I’m not saying it’s absolutely justified, I am leaving open the possibility that this was a necessary action due to something that might be happening behind the scenes.

More to the point, I don’t think commenting about Ethier is going to lead the front office to fire him.

—–

That said, what probably will get him fired is Mattingly effectively calling out Ned Colletti and Stan Kasten for roster construction.

When Mattingly spoke with reporters in Milwaukee on Wednesday, as the manager of a last-place team with the highest payroll in baseball history, he said this: “It’s not just all, ‘Let’s go put an All-Star team out there and play games, and the team with the All-Star team wins.’ … All grit and no talent is not going to get you there, and all talent and no grit is not going to get you there. There’s got to be a mixture of both.”

Mattingly benched outfielder Andre Ethier on Wednesday, explaining the decision thusly: “For me, today, I’m putting out my lineup that I feel is going to be the most competitive and going to compete the hardest.”

That is two “I,” one “my” and one “me” in an industry that emphasizes “us” and “we.” Players and the front office notice those words.

In stark contrast, this is how Mattingly explained the weekend decision to demote catcher Tim Federowicz rather than clear a roster spot by cutting either infielder Luis Cruz or catcher Ramon Hernandez: “That was the move that the organization thought was the best.”

And, as the Dodgers’ bullpen lost all three games last weekend in Atlanta, Mattingly appeared to point out how the front office stashed surplus starters in the bullpen, forcing the team to cut veteran relievers who might have been useful

“We had guys get away early who seemed to fit,” Mattingly said.

The disagreement over roster decisions was never more obvious than the decision to send down Tim Federowicz, who had been playing as the primary backup over Ramon Hernandez. Unlike the other stuff, this is a very real problem when the manager and front officer are thinking in very different direction.

On one hand, the disconnect is unhealthy and it seems like a death wish by Mattingly for him to rip his bosses. On the other hand, if it’s a fight between Mattingly and Colletti, I’m in Mattingly’s corner everyday of the week.

—–

But will all this really get him fired? One GM thinks so, but neither Kasten nor Colletti will be in town until Friday, which leaves me thinking two things: 1) Mattingly already knows he’s gonna get fired 2) neither Kasten nor Colletti are as sensitive to his critique as the media makes it out to be and don’t really care.

Either way, though, Mattingly appears to be safe for the upcoming series.

Don Mattingly will be managing the Dodgers on Friday when they open a three-game series at home against the St. Louis Cardinals, according to two people familiar with the team’s plans.

Not exactly a ringing endorsement, but certainly not one that seems to confirm the belief that Mattingly already knew he was fired when making his comments.

So it seems he’ll stick around a bit longer, for better or worse, and the only thing I’m certain of at this point is that a lot of words will be written about this situation.

—–

All of this is to say I’m not sure exactly how significant of an issue the ranting on the team is going to affect Mattingly, but I do think that the disconnect between him and the front office is troublesome and will likely be the cause for his undoing with the Dodgers.

I’ve said again and again that my continued backing of him was based on how he handled relations with the players and the clubhouse, as it certainly wasn’t because of his decision-making acumen. Therefore, my support for him, meaningless as it may be, is actively in doubt now, as he may or may not have just lost the players. Additionally, even if he is right, it seems to be causing more distractions than anything else, which is rarely a net positive.

With that said, the final chapter is yet to be written, and Mattingly seems to have taken a gamble to see if a different approach will work to pull the Dodgers out of whatever horrid funk they’re in. We’ll see how it plays out with the team going forward, and we’ll see whether or not Mattingly deciding to keep it real will cause his tenure with the team to finally go wrong.

So you’ve heard a lot about Don Mattingly and his job security recently — hell, I just wrote about it — but this article from Tim Brown of Yahoo! Sports spread around yesterday, and it touched on all the common refrains you’ve been hearing, including harping on the team’s hitting with RISP.

They wonder why the players don’t spend more time with hitting coach Mark McGwire, why they don’t play as hard as their opponents, why they continue to lose games in the little gray areas where good teams thrive. That is, why they don’t catch the ball as well as others, why they don’t toughen and produce with runners in scoring position, why they don’t finish hitters from the mound. These are supposed to be good players, right?

Is it Mattingly? Has this group of players gone soft under Mattingly, whose leadership method allows men to be men, and perhaps thins when the men refuse to live to that minimum standard?

So basically a compilation of complaints that I assume were gathered from the fan rants on MLB.com and ESPN.com comments. Swell.

But besides the fact that basically every single Dodgers blogger has written a more complete and well-reasoned piece on Mattingly and his status, the consistent thing that always comes up from the mainstream media is the Dodgers ability (or inability) to hit with RISP.

Yes, the bullpen has been a mess lately. Yes, this here’s a team sport, and the Dodgers don’t look like a team that’s all that desperate to win. Still, Kemp and Ethier were a combined 15 for 81 with runners in scoring position going into the Milwaukee series, and just one of those 15 hits was for extra bases.

Standard stuff.

But the amusing thing about all these narratives? Matt Kemp has actually been clutch on the season, and the Dodgers have been one of the most clutch teams in baseball over the past month.

Don’t believe me? I don’t blame you.

You’ve heard a lot about the Dodgers struggles with RISP because it’s everywhere: stories before the game, tweets during the game, stories after the game. And while the facts of the matter aren’t wrong in this case, the problem is that the statistic itself doesn’t account for their skill/performance outside of those situations.

In other words, put a regular fan at the plate with RISP and they will OPS .000, but it doesn’t mean they’re unclutch, it just means that they suck. That’s where the stat ‘Clutch’ comes into play, as it accounts for overall performance versus performance in clutch situations.

On the season, the Dodgers have done as poorly as you would have expected, checking in at 23rd in the MLB this year in Clutch, behind the Astros.

*Click To Enlarge*

So that appears to fit the narrative.

However, in the past 30 days, they’re fifth in the MLB in being so so so clutchy clutchy clutch.

*Click To Enlarge*

So if you wanted to fill in a narrative for this reality, you could. For example, “The Dodgers have been feeling the pressure mounting due to their terrible start to the year, but they are heroically responding under duress to fight for the manager they love dearly”, or some utter garbage like that.

As you probably figured out by now, though, creating an equally dumb counter-narrative isn’t my goal. Besides, the Dodgers still aren’t scoring more runs despite recently coming through when it matters, which is primarily due to that ‘WPA’ column barely being positive. Simply put, the point is that the Dodgers still aren’t able to put bodies across the plate because they still generally suck at hitting. The team didn’t suddenly become more clutch in the last 30 days, nor were they less clutch to start the season. Clutch is a statistic that fluctuates constantly because it’s not necessarily indicative of a skill, and the exact same caveat applies for hitting with RISP, as the team has a .296 BABIP overall, but a .263 BABIP with RISP.

Look, there’s always an ebb and flow to these situational numbers, so at the end of the day, the only thing you actually can rely on is the overall talent of hitters. The Dodgers struggles in the clutch or with RISP or whatever else are a result of a team that is simply struggling to hit in 2013, and it’s certainly not indicative of a squad that needs leadership or fire or whatever other garbage people are printing nowadays.

The painful reality is that there’s no Clutch or RISP coaching to be done, really. The players simply need to perform in the batter’s box, clutch situations or otherwise. Unfortunately, like most things, it’s easier said than done.

The discontent with the Dodgers was loud and clear after yesterday’s loss, and for good reason. The team is last in the NL West, have the sixth-worst record in the MLB, and are tied for the fourth-worst run differential in baseball.

It’s a horrible time to be the manager of the Dodgers right now, and we all know it, including Eric Stephen at True Blue LA, Mike Petriello at Mike Scioscia’s Tragic Illness, Jon Weisman at Dodger Thoughts, and even I’ve previously given my thoughts on Don Mattingly. However, the negativity certainly seems to have peaked after getting recently swept by the Braves in excruciating fashion, so the managerial issues merited a deeper look.

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On Don Mattingly’s Assumed Firing

For all the articles being written about Don Mattingly’s imminent demise, I haven’t actually seen anything of substance from the people that matter. Yes, he’s gotten variations of the dreaded vote of confidence, but all the talk has either been from people asking the upper management about his status or pure speculation by journalists, local and national alike.

Usually though, there’s some leak or sign that the higher-ups are unhappy with the job the manager’s doing and are about to drop the hammer. The running assumption seems to be that he’ll be fired today or sometime very soon, but that seems to be a lot of noise without much to actually indicate he’s going to be let go.

Obviously if things continue down this road he’ll be the fall guy no matter what, because that’s what managers and coaches exist for, but as of right now? I would have expected to hear at least one insider source say he’s close to done before anything final happens, so I’m not sure I see him being fired right away.

Then again, Craig Calcaterra of Hardball Talk seems to believe that Ken Rosenthal was teasing out inside info that Mattingly is about to be canned. So maybe I’m not reading between the lines enough, but either way, my point is that we’re all sort of guessing and speculating right now instead of going off anything reliable.

On A Need For “Fire” From The Manager

Many people — some who I respect and some who I don’t — seem to be of the belief that Mattingly isn’t right for the job because the team is flat and he’s not the yelling and screaming type. Judging by the complaints I’m fielding about Mattingly on Twitter, it’s the popular theory among fans as well.

Given the trend in what people seem to want out of a manager, it seems like a good time to remind everybody that yelling and screaming types generally don’t make the best authority figures, and the ones that do get appointed usually don’t last long. Give your boss at your job that personality and it’s not hard to figure out why it wears on people over time, and that rings especially true with the modern athlete, as they are even less responsive to the mad dictator personality.

I do understand why people want to visually see “fire” though, because the fans are mad and frustrated, so it incenses them even more to see managers or coaches or players not as mad as they are. But we go through this discussion every time there’s a struggling player who doesn’t go around throwing stuff daily like Andre Ethier used to after a strikeout. No, it doesn’t mean they don’t care or they don’t try, it just means everybody internalizes disappointment differently and goes about trying to solve their problems differently. After all, remember that Ethier was told to tone down the outbursts, specifically because the coaches thought it was affecting his play. Now people want a manager doing all that?

Besides, it’s ironic timing to be complaining about Mattingly being soft when just yesterday he publicly called out Kenley Jansen and Dee Gordon for what he perceived as mistakes by them. But those types of things seem to be widely glossed over because it doesn’t fit the narrative people have of Mattingly’s persona.

Even disregarding all the above, I can’t honestly believe anybody thinks that Mattingly yelling at the team will reset Ethier’s aging curve, or loosen up Matt Kemp‘s shoulder, or magically work to prevent injuries, so what people really want is making a move just for the sake of making a move. I just can’t see the sense in that.

On Potential Replacements

If Mattingly is going to be replaced, then a replacement needs to be found. Everybody would want a Joe Maddon, but that’s obviously impossible at this point. Also, names like Brad Ausmus (who I find interesting) and others outside the organization have been suggested (please no Mike Scioscia or Tony LaRussa), but I can’t recall the last time a manager got canned and the team hired a high-profile candidate outside the system to swoop in.

As such, I have to assume any replacement will come internally, specifically either Tim Wallach or Trey Hillman. Wallach is an interesting candidate, though I’m not exactly sure what he’ll do differently to make the team better. He has no MLB managerial experience, so if an authority figure is what the team is lacking, I fail to see how he would help change things. Then there’s Hillman, whose track record includes a glorious stint with the Royals where he made much of the same mistakes Mattingly is ripped for, plus his players rebelled against him for being a phony. Since that disastrous stint with the Royals, maybe he’s learned? Who knows, but if you want to stick with track record and what we know so far, he’s a downgrade if anything.

So again, if you can give me a Joe Maddon-type candidate, I’m all for replacing Mattingly right this second. Unfortunately, that guy is not available, and I have more confidence in Mattingly’s ability to resist bunting with a runner in scoring position than I do relying on Ned Colletti to find the next progressive, genius manager.

—–

I’m personally of the belief that a move doesn’t have to be made. That said, do I care a ton if Mattingly gets fired or not? No, not really. I’m not a fan of Mattingly’s decision-making at all, so the clubhouse aspect is the only thing that’s keeping me on board right now. However, any replacement, especially one found by Colletti, is unlikely to be much more progressive in his handling of just about everything. Therefore, what I really don’t get is people who are passionate and insistent that Mattingly gets canned, as if changing the manager will magically make everybody better at baseball.

The fact of the matter is that this team is not this bad, and — barring even more injuries — they’ll be better in the future, with or without Mattingly. Why? Because players win and lose games, and as the people on the field begin to regress to the mean, so will the team’s record.

So focus on the manager all you want, but the roster is what will get the team over .500 or to the playoffs or to the World Series, and that responsibility lies above the authority of any coach.

The Dodgers handed Brandon League a three-year contract and the closer’s role heading into the 2013 season, but his predictable fall from temporary grace in the role has led to continued questions about his viability as the closer, especially with Kenley Jansen waiting in the wings.

It’s easy to see why questions are being asked, as any comparison between the two relievers’ resumes is comical, and it doesn’t matter if we’re talking about just 2013 or their entire careers.

By now, due to what you see in the chart above, I think most of the fan base has concluded that Kenley deserves the closer’s spot over League. However, that assumes that the closer’s spot is the place where the team should be putting their best reliever.

Don Mattingly doesn’t think that’s correct, and I’m inclined to agree.

Don Mattingly has adjusted his late-inning bullpen use recently by deploying Kenley Jansen to face the hitters posing the greatest threat, no matter the inning.

“I don’t like a committee of guys, that’s always unsettling, like every day is a tryout, and that’s not the environment I want for my pitchers,” said Mattingly. “I want them to know I’m confident in them and trust them. It’s not like you give up a run and you’re out.

“But the way it’s been going is the best way to do it. Kenley gets the tougher part of the order, and there’s a chance of anybody in the ninth. We don’t have Mariano [Rivera]. You see teams changing all the time in the last inning or two.”

For the moment, forget about statistics or the fact that you hate Mattingly or whatever else. Logically, what he’s saying makes absolute sense: Use your best reliever in the most important situations in the game against their best hitters.

Basically, Mattingly’s plan is to use Kenley as an ace reliever of old, a move which is only bolstered by the fact that Kenley has a history of being able to go multiple innings. Another reason it works is because the Dodger bullpen has been hit by injuries and ineffectiveness like the rest of the team, so despite League’s struggles, he’s still projected to get late-inning outs even if he’s removed as closer. And since blowing a lead in the eighth sucks just as much as in the ninth (or more since the closer doesn’t even get used then), simply stripping League of the overhyped title accomplishes little to solve the root problem.

Yes, League and Ronald Belisario and friends have to get it together somewhat for this to work, but that was always true to begin with. If they continue to tank, the bullpen fails miserably anyway, with or without this strategy, as Kenley is only one man. As such, it’s hard to see the downside to this move besides the risk for overwork (a temptation, regardless).

Whether you want to admit it or not, if Mattingly actually uses Kenley like he says, it’s quite the progressive move for a manager whose game decisions are generally regressive. I’ve been calling for Dodgers managers to use their best relievers in the most important situations forever now, and if Donnie sticks to what he’s saying, there may finally be progress on that front, even if it is partially out of desperation.

In six short days with the team in 2013, Dee Gordon has already showcased everything that once made him a top prospect and everything that made him one of the worst players in the MLB last year.

It’s a tiny sample, yet he’s managed to fit in so much amazement and failure that his performance has been noteworthy, regardless. In a way, he’s proven both his supporters and detractors correct so far.

Me? I’m neutral on his call-up, because while I think there’s certainly more upside to him than Justin Sellers or Luis Cruz or Juan Uribe, there’s also downside.

Generally speaking, Sellers and Cruz might be around 0 WAR players. Maybe they’re 0.5 WAR guys, maybe they’re -0.5 WAR guys, but at the end of the day, they should fall in around there. Fringe utility players, basically.

Gordon, on the other hand, has always had an upside around a 3 WAR player, but his downside, as seen last year, is that of around a -3 WAR player. Unlike Cruz and Sellers and Uribe, his defense can be atrocious. Thus, if he hits like they do — and he certainly did last year — it’s two negatives instead of just one.

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Hitting

He’s hit .316/.409/.421/.830 thus far, yes, but it comes with a .429 BABIP, which is high even for somebody of his speed. The promising part though is his new patience, but the trade-off appears to be more strikeouts, which happen far too often for the slap-and-run type of hitter he is.

Undoubtedly, this aspect of his game has been his strength so far, but whether it continues over a significant sample or not has always been the issue.

Fielding

He’s shown range and the ability to get to balls that not many can (GIF #1), but he’s also shown the tendency to make careless errors and have a lack of fundamental skills (GIF #2/#3/#4).

On only one of the three misplays featured here was he marked with an error, but it’s still poor defense … and it’s only half of the misplays I found.

Baserunning

Electric, right? Look at how he takes all those extra bases and does the little things right and … oh he just ran into three outs in a game? Drat.

—–

Flaws and all, fans understandably tend to side with Dee because of the “wow” moments he brings to the table, stuff that guys with less raw talent simply can’t even fathom doing. Dee is made for mind-blowing bursts of speed and flair that lead to extreme excitement, but he often follows that with lulls of fundamental inadequacy and lack of baseball skills, which is the part people tend to gloss over too easily.

My point? For all the highs and lows so far, his WAR on the year is 0. There’s probably not much more fitting a grade than that.

People fall in love with the explosiveness but tend forget that baseball, for better or worse, is more about the routine and the boring.

For example, Matt Kemp‘s debut was full of flash and flair as well. He bombed seven homers in his first 50 plate appearances, but then got exposed down the stretch due to his lack of refinement. From there, it was the boring things — laying off/hitting hanging breaking balls, working the count, going to right field — that led him to become an MVP-caliber player, not mindlessly hacking and trying to club bombs.

Dee will never get to that level, granted, but at some point I would like to see a hint of progress in the refinement area of his game. Kemp showed that slowly but surely, much like all prospects that pan out do, but the concern is that Dee has been rather stagnant for a while now.

——

Perhaps predictably, articles are being written about how Dee gives this team a “shot in the arm” or a “much needed boost of energy”, but the reality is that’s not the player the Dodgers need him to be. He’s ALWAYS been the “energy guy”, the “tools guy”, the “flash guy”, even last year. What the Dodgers need from him more than anything right now is something he’s never been able to accomplish: stability.

The day he gives the team daily consistency over flashy highlights is the day that I’ll buy in, and I think most others will as well. Until then, though, the Dee Gordon experience will likely continue to be a roller-coaster of alternating cheers and facepalms.

Strap in.

Mike Scioscia‘s job with the Angels is in jeopardy due to their slow start, much like people seem to think Don Mattingly‘s job is. Ken Rosenthal throws gas on both fires by suggesting that the Angels deal Scioscia to the Dodgers.

Ken Rosenthal of FOXSports.com believes Angels manager Mike Scioscia needs a fresh start and proposes the Dodgers as the most obvious possibility. Rosenthal notes owner Artie Moreno would recoil at the idea of Scioscia managing the crosstown rivals, but the Angels would be better for it if they could obtain a significant player or two in a John Farrell-style trade.

As a standalone rumor, this wouldn’t bother me that much, but this idea of somehow getting Scioscia to the Dodgers is gaining momentum for whatever reason, and I can’t express enough how much I hate the idea.

Why? I think he’s a downgrade.

——

My thoughts on this are certainly not out of any fanboyism over Mattingly, either.

If you follow me on Twitter, you know that I frequently critique Mattingly’s game management style. His frequency of bunting, the odd personnel choices, and poor bullpen management are all things that I recognize as problematic from time to time.

That is to say that I’m not exactly calling him the best manager in the MLB, far from it. But as I’ve said before, I watch a lot of baseball around the league and follow a lot of other team’s bloggers, and I see similar issues/complaints about almost every manager, sans a few.

So while Don might not be ideal, I certainly think he’s average.

Furthermore, game management is a small part of what managers exist for. As this article points out, the universal standard for what comprises a quality manager is basically a jumble of intangibles. Therefore, their true value is keeping players happy, getting out of their way, and letting them play, which, hate him or not, Mattingly and his staff have been able to do with the core of the Dodgers team, unlike his predecessors Joe Torre and Grady Little.

That’s why, despite all my complaints, I still defend Mattingly’s position.

—–

But besides that, why don’t I like Scioscia, right? Former Dodgers catcher, supposedly the future Dodgers manager before he was passed over, and supported by Dodger fans.

Well, for starters, all of those things Dodger fans bash Mattingly for? Scioscia does them more often … much more often.

Credit to Jay Jaffe for both that chart and for coining #BuntFucked.

So do you hate when the Dodgers get #BuntFucked by Mattingly? Well, boy oh boy, are you in for a treat if Scioscia strolls into town.

Scioscia is the biggest proponent of small-ball in the MLB, and it’s not only bunting, as this extends to leading the league in hit-and-run attempts and placing in the top five in stolen base attempt rate. So if giving up free outs aren’t your thing, then Scioscia is a downgrade*.

*And we all remember the Mike Napoli/Jeff Mathis debate, yes? Yes.

Furthermore, at the start of his career, Scioscia seemed to have this aura surrounding his teams — primarily built through the media — because they seemed to outperform their expected wins year after year. Yet, without Joe Maddon on his bench, his teams have increasingly become less and less adept at outperforming their expectancies, which I doubt is a coincidence given what we now know about Maddon’s defensive shifts and managerial aptitude.

—–

So by all indications, trading for Scioscia over Mattingly would:

1) Put question marks in a clubhouse without them.

2) Exacerbate all of the game management flaws people already dislike in Mattingly.

3) Expose fans to a manager with a longer history of questionable personnel decisions.

But most importantly, the team would have to apparently give up “one or two” valuable assets for the joy of all of the above.

Nightmares, this scenario gives me them.

Luis Cruz has been … not-so-good in 2013. Okay, he’s been absolutely atrocious. Just terrible.

Mike Petriello at Mike Scioscia’s Tragic Illness has gone through all the statistical hoops to show exactly how bad Cruz has been in 2013 (go read it, even I didn’t realize how terrible he’s been).

Hint: It’s bad.

2013 lowest wOBA, min 50 PA
5. Dustin Ackley, .174
4. Clint Barmes, .155
3. Aaron Hicks, .148
2. Jeff Keppinger, .137
1. Luis Cruz, .089

So Cruz is the worst hitter in baseball this season among regular players, and it’s not even particularly close. Wonderful.

Okay, so that puts his 2013 into context, but it doesn’t answer the question of why he’s been so bad.

Granted, the most significant factor at play is that he’s been a career minor-leaguer and that this is probably closer to reality than 2012, but has anything else besides that changed?

—–

Well, a lot of the horrific line has to do with a .103 BABIP, which is astoundingly low. However, that’s not to say it’s necessarily all been bad luck, as he has an amazingly high 31.8% infield pop-up rate. The scary thing is that’s being generous, because if you watch the games you’d see how many fly-balls he hits that are of the lazy can-of-corn variety into the shallow outfield. Furthermore, his 7.7% infield hit rate is unusually high for a batter who’s not a burner, so he’s actually been quite fortunate in that regard.

The bad contact is only compounded by increased struggles to actually make contact and an almost non-existent walk rate. Last year, he walked 3% of the time and struck out 12% of the time, which already threw up red flags for many. However, it’s been worse this year, as his walk rate is even worse (2%) and the strikeouts are up (16%).

In other words, all signs point to the serious concerns being valid, and the root cause of that may be how he’s being approached by pitchers now.

Opposing hurlers now have a history on him to start the year, and they seem to be pitching him much differently. Last year, he saw 37.8% four-seamers and produced 0.34 runs above average per 100 pitches against that pitch. Additionally, he saw 11.4% two-seamers and produced -2.66 RAA/100. This year, he’s seeing 30.5% four-seamers and 5.2% two seamers, producing -5.74 RAA/100 and -7.03 RAA/100, respectively.

That’s a difference of 13.5% less four-seam and two-seam fastballs that he’s seeing this year. Keeping a batter off-balance is one of the most important jobs of any pitcher, and their new sequencing approach to Cruz seems to be doing just that.

Pitchers always adjust to hitters and vice versa. It’s a constant battle, but the hitters that stay in the majors are able to adjust back, and that’s now Cruz’s goal going forward.

—–

Perhaps another reason is a mechanical change. I got a tweet last week asking about his mechanics, and I finally got around to taking a look.

Before is on the top and recent is on the bottom.

This shows how Cruz is setting up, and it’s of the frame before the pitcher starts his motion. Not much changes from this moment until he starts his approach.

There’s a pretty clear difference here, as he’s standing more upright and more open in the before than he is currently. Additionally, his hands were much higher before.

None of this actually matters, of course. Well, unless it carries over to his approach to the pitch…

Not a ton of difference, but I can clearly see that he’s a lot more compact now than he was previously. He used to stand tall throughout the approach, but now he’s compressing his body more for whatever reason.

The most significant issue, though, is that he was further away from the plate before and used to continue to dive towards it after this frame. With his current setup, he now stays squarer to the pitcher.

None of that is especially problematic, but it’s a case of ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’, and I’m not sure what exactly precipitated this change. If nothing else, he’s clearly standing closer to the plate this year and compressing his approach to the ball. Hopefully none of the Dodgers coaches did anything to him, because with a timing device like his and a ton of moving parts, him hitting well is more dependent than most on his timing, and taking steps to change that is foolish.

—–

With all that said, none of this (and I mean none of it) is going to compensate for the skill aspect of his struggles. A top prospect with all the tools in the world will struggle at times to become a major-league regular, so a career minor-leaguer becoming a regular was always going to be the longest of shots.

Correcting the pitch selection or mechanics of guys like Chad Billingsley or Matt Kemp or Carl Crawford or even James Loney will be far more impactful than fixing Luis Cruz because of the talent gap. But he’s never been THIS bad, so subtle changes to his current approach could lead to respectable production, which could land him in a utility role due to his plus defense at two positions.

Tom Garfinkel, President and CEO of the Padres, spoke with season-ticket holders about the Zack Greinke/Carlos Quentin brawl, and he placed the blame on Greinke for the incident.

While somewhat deluded, it’s not all that surprising. However, also included on the tape that Jeff Passan of Yahoo! Sports acquired is audio of him essentially mocking Greinke (who has social anxiety disorder) as autistic.

“He threw at him on purpose, OK?” Garfinkel told an estimated crowd of 40 or 50 at Petco Park on Friday, a day after the fight. “That’s what happened. They can say 3-and-2 count, 2-1 game, no one does that. Zack Greinke is a different kind of guy. Anyone seen ‘Rain Man’? He’s a very smart guy.”

What a class act.

The ignorance of equating autism and anxiety is astounding, and it speaks to the general notion that anybody not considered “normal” between the ears can be generalized with a catch-all “head case” pejorative.

I expect as much from players and managers, but from the President and CEO? Disgusting. One would think they would at least know better.

Garfinkel went on to apologize to Stan Kasten and Greinke … but not really:

“I was emotional the day after the game and regrettably, while defending our player, I said some things I shouldn’t have, especially as it relates to Zack Greinke,” Garfinkel told Yahoo! Sports. “I was out of line and I apologize.

The thing is though, he doesn’t care. Remember, this was a private meeting with a group of season-ticket holders, so he only cares that he got caught.

I mean, he said as much himself:

“This is my opinion, and I can’t say it publicly,” Garfinkel told the crowd, “but I guess this is public, so please don’t tweet it out. We’re in the trust tree here, in the nest.

In his apology, he doesn’t specifically address what was wrong about his rant. Rather, he just gives a stock ‘sorry’ because he’s in damage control mode.

As if to pile on with his ignorance, he goes on to literally make up justifications for Quentin charging the mound, blames Greinke for getting hurt, and makes a comment in opposition to what Quentin has said to the media.

“Obviously, I don’t condone fighting and I wish it wouldn’t have happened. You never want to see any player get hurt.”

“I don’t know about you guys, but I’m 6-3, 225,” Garfinkel told the ticket holders. “If Carlos Quentin was running at me, I would not put my shoulder down.”

I got into a few arguments over this logic on Twitter, but to me, arguing this is completely asinine. Basically, he’s criticizing how Greinke choose to defend himself.

Why … why is the person being attacked responsible for the damage done to him?

“I mean, yeah, he got punched in the face. But your honor, why didn’t the victim turn his head away to lessen the damage?”

Sweet argument.

Then there’s this point lie he told, which Passan called him on:

Garfinkel’s certainty about the purpose of the pitch stemmed from information he received about Greinke’s predilection to avoid pitching inside as well as the belief in the Padres’ front office that the count and situation didn’t necessarily absolve him from intentionally hitting Quentin. Garfinkel told the crowd he saw a heat map, which highlights the locations a pitcher has targeted in the past, and that it showed over the last three years Greinke had not thrown a single pitch on a 3-2 count to right-handed hitters on the inner half of the plate.

The heat map was misleading. PITCHf/x data provided by Baseball Prospectus’ Dan Brooks and Harry Pavlidis shows of the 219 full-count pitches Greinke threw to right-handers from 2010-2012, 81 were on the inner half of the plate. While the 37 percent inside rate is among the bottom one-third among starting pitchers, the data shows, Greinke is nowhere near the unlikeliest to throw there on full counts – and had gone there plenty of times, both in and out of the strike zone, in recent years.

Welp, so much for that.

Also amusing was this part of the speech, in which he blames Greinke for not starting a dialogue with Quentin:

Greinke also knew the potential consequences of hitting Quentin, Garfinkel told the crowd. A threat for retribution had been relayed to him following the second time he plunked Quentin with a pitch, in 2009.

“When Zack Greinke threw at his head a couple times, [Quentin] let it be known through teammates and intermediaries and others that if he does that again, he’s going to have a problem,” Garfinkel said. “This was a couple years ago. So Zack was very aware of that and Zack never apologized and never told him, ‘Hey, I didn’t mean to throw at you. It got away from me.’ Whatever. This was a couple years ago. He knew darn well that was going [to happen].”

Let me get this straight, Tom. You insult the guy for being “Rain Man“, but you expect the same person, who actually has social anxiety disorder, to open up a dialogue with a rival who’s pissed at him?

Again, sound logic. Seems like Tom really thought this one through.

Perhaps dumbest of all, though, is his admission that neither the organization nor Quentin knows what Greinke said to Quentin prior to him charging the mound:

Following the brawl and his ejection, Quentin insinuated that Greinke had said something to him, prompting him to charge the mound, and that it “was the final straw.” Garfinkel said neither he nor Quentin is certain of what Greinke said, and that even some people in the Padres’ baseball-operations department who can read lips were unsure.

“We don’t know what he said,” Garfinkel said. “I asked Carlos. He doesn’t know what he said. I do know that, I mean, everybody saw the tape. Everybody saw what happened. He didn’t say, ‘I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to hit you.’ He threw his glove down, stuck his chest out.”

1) He threw his glove down after Quentin had started charging him. You have to be seriously delusional to dispute this … which is why he’s disputing it.

2)

Carlos Quentin to media: “I charged Greinke because of what he said to me.” Padres CEO to fans: “Carlos doesn’t know what Greinke said.” OK.

— Molly Knight (@molly_knight) April 18, 2013

Oops.

Way to call your own player’s truthfulness into question.

—–

So not only did Garfinkel represent the Padres poorly by showing off his ignorance, lack of rationality, and by outright lying, but he also indirectly called Quentin a liar by revealing that nobody has any idea what Greinke said, despite that being used as justification for fighting him.

So if there was any doubt that all of this was nothing more than the result of a Quentin temper tantrum (he once ended his own season with one), and that Quentin’s excuses for the incident after the fact are all baloney, then there shouldn’t be anymore. None of them knows what happened, and they can’t even get their stories straight, but they’ll go to the media saying they know the reason stuff went down, they’ll take offensive jabs at the opposition, and they’ll lie to their fanbase to justify it all.

Pathetic.

C.J. Nitkowski, for reasons unknown, decided to inject himself into the Zack Greinke/Carlos Quentin/Dodgers/Padres brawl discussion, basically saying that Quentin doesn’t hang over the plate any more than Matt Kemp does.

Carlos Quentin stands on top of the plate, hangs over the strike zone? You sure about that? twitter.com/CJNitkowski/st…

— CJ Nitkowski (@CJNitkowski) April 12, 2013

Kemp, same camera, same angle. twitter.com/CJNitkowski/st…

— CJ Nitkowski (@CJNitkowski) April 12, 2013

Damning screencaps, right? Yeah, a lot of people seemed to think so, hence this response, because they both conveniently only show their setups and don’t show why pitchers complain about Quentin diving over the plate and why he gets hit so much.

I find it interesting that he clearly appears to be misleading his followers here, because it’s obvious that the point of contention is how they end up after footstrike, not how they setup. I mean, who cares how a guy sets up if he’s on top of the plate when the ball is about to cross it.

Anyway, so what’s up with the differing reputations of Quentin and Kemp if we’re to believe what the screencaps show, right?

Ah right, it’s because Kemp actually tends to pull out and away from the plate after his setup, while Quentin … well … he dives in after his setup, sort of like everybody has been saying.

That’s both of them at footstrike, where it actually matters in terms of getting out of the way of being hit.

It sort of sucks that both are wearing dark undershirts, because it’s hard to tell exactly where their elbows are (Quentin’s is basically over the inside corner), but it’s still clear to see why Quentin would get hit more than Kemp.

Besides the fact that it’s harder to rotate out of the way when you dive towards the plate, thus making it harder to avoid being HBP (it’s why he can’t simply move like NotGraphs wants), Kemp has a ton more room for a pitcher to miss inside before even coming close to hitting him. With Quentin, if you miss anywhere in and above the belt, he’s at risk to take it off his forearm. You know, sort of like he did twice in this series. And 100+ other times over his career.

To be frank, I feel stupid for even having to write this post, since a player doesn’t have one of the highest HBP rates ever for no reason, but people seem to actually be buying into this garbage, and Jayson Stark actually retweeted it as “interesting”, so it deserved an explanation.

Clayton Kershaw‘s extension has been widely anticipated by Dodgers fans for a while now, and most (including me) seem to want it done as soon as possible. Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear as if that’s necessarily going to be the case.

A week ago, Dylan Hernandez said nothing was imminent:

Clayton Kershaw’s agent was at Dodger Stadium on Tuesday, but a new deal between the Dodgers and their ace didn’t appear imminent, according to people familiar with the situation who weren’t authorized to speak on the matter.

He was right on the money, as no deal has been reached yet and figures are still being thrown around, though the $200 million price tag seems about right, according to Ken Rosenthal.

Clayton Kershaw’s people and the Dodgers are still talking with the season underway, but no one really knows what’s going on behind closed doors. At the same time, no one should be surprised if Kershaw winds up being the first true $200MM pitcher. Inking him for a total of ten years would keep him locked up through his age 34 season and even though that length sounds crazy, Felix Hernandez is signed through age 33 and Justin Verlander through age 36. Rosenthal’s guess is an eight-year, $200MM extension on top of the two years of control that he has left.

If that sounds nuts though, then this might sound even more so, as Kershaw’s price might be getting higher, according to Jon Heyman.

“I hear they’re already over $200 million,” one baseball official said.

Regardless, the encouraging thing is that everybody is reporting that the Dodgers and Kershaw’s agent are deep in negotiations, and that rarely ends without an extension getting done. It figures to be especially true with these new owners and their deep pockets.

Yesterday, the Dodgers dealt Aaron Harang to the Rockies for catcher Ramon Hernandez and effectively cleared room in their bullpen for the return of Chad Billingsley on Wednesday.

The Dodgers on Saturday made official their trade of pitcher Aaron Harang and cash to the Rockies for catcher Ramon Hernandez.

Oddly enough though, the Rockies designated Harang for assignment immediately, so he’ll likely be elsewhere soon.

As for Hernandez himself, he’s certainly a more proven option than Tim Federowicz, though better is arguable. He’s about a league-average hitter (96 OPS+) for his career, but he’s 37 now and at age 36 he hit .217/.247/.353/.605 with the Rockies. He used to be a solid defender, but that has fallen off considerably with age and is probably a downgrade from T-Fed in that regard. Essentially, he has to hit to be useful, and the Dodgers are banking that he can regain his form, because he could be useful in relieving A.J. Ellis and providing much needed pop off the bench if he’s right.

More than anything though, this was about dumping Harang to clear room in the bullpen so that the return of Billingsley wouldn’t result in something like Paco Rodriguez having to be sent down. So from that perspective, even if Hernandez tanks, they still have T-Fed in the minors and it doesn’t affect the team much.

Money-wise, as you would imagine, the Dodgers are eating salary.

Counting Sunday, Mar. 31, six days of the 183-day season have lapsed. That means the Dodgers are on the hook for $3,095,082 of Hernandez’s salary, and the Rockies responsible for $6,770,492 for Harang, plus the $2 million buyout in 2014, though Jon Heyman of CBS Sports reported the Dodgers would send $4.25 million to Colorado.

So, instead of having $9 million guaranteed to Harang, the Dodgers will instead pay approximately $7,574,590 ($3,095,082 for Hernandez, $229,508 for Harang, and $4.25 million to Colorado). Subtract the major league salary that would have been paid to Tim Federowicz and the Dodgers save approximately $2 million and upgraded their catching depth.

So the team saves ~$2 million but will pay yet another player to perform elsewhere. It’s not a significant deal in terms of impact, but I get the feeling that when all is said and done about the pre-Richie Rich Ned Colletti era, boy are a lot of the contracts that were handed out going to look ridiculous in retrospect.

The news of Clayton Kershaw‘s allegedly imminent extension with the Dodgers was broken recently by Mike Petriello, and since then, reporters have chimed in, all confirming the existence of talks.

—–

Jon Heyman confirmed the negotiations and mentioned that Opening Day was not a hard deadline despite what Kershaw has previously said to have preferred.

Star left-hander Clayton Kershaw and the Dodgers are quietly talking about a multiyear deal, people familiar with the situation say.

While the sides officially aren’t speaking publicly about it, based on how the new Dodgers ownership team has acted and the value it places on big-time players, it’s hard to imagine the Dodgers not locking up Kershaw at some point. Opening day isn’t necessarily a hard deadline, though Giants star Buster Posey and Tigers star Justin Verlander treated it as one before making their big deals, for $167 million and $180 million, respectively.

Tim Brown confirmed the talks but says a Dodger official shot down the report, though Kershaw himself seemed to tease that something was in the works.

Nudged again, asked if an agreement could be reached by Monday, Kershaw grinned accommodatingly and said, “Never know.” All lilting at the end, like “stay tuned” or “miracles happen,” one of the two.

Regardless, this ends well for Kershaw. It probably ends well for the Dodgers. An Internet report Friday said the two were nearing agreement on an eight-year, $200 million extension. The Dodgers have not been of the mood to comment either way, though one official shook his head gravely at the report.

Negotiations proceed. As of Friday afternoon, there was nothing. A lot could change in a day, two, almost three. Presumably, if there is a handshake, it will be to seal something in the range of eight years, and something in the neighborhood of $200 million. That would appear to be where the market is headed.

Given that the official Dodgers executive position on the matter is that rule number one about the Kershaw contract negotiations is that there is no Kershaw contract negotiations, it doesn’t shock me that a random Dodgers official refused to confirm a deal.

Locally, Bill Shaikin also confirmed that negotiations are taking place.

People familiar with the situation who spoke on the condition of anonymity said Friday that the Dodgers were having contract conversations with former National League Cy Young Award winner Clayton Kershaw.

Perhaps most promising, though, were tweets by Ramona Shelburne, who yesterday after the game described the extension as “imminent” and that word around the clubhouse was the deal would “get done”.

So for everybody asking about it and worrying about it because Kershaw’s preferred deadline has already passed, I would advise you to calm down, because all indications seem to point to a deal being finished sometime soon.

Clayton Kershaw will be extended for 8 years and $200 million by the Dodgers sooner than later, according to Mike Petriello, who is now a reporter as well as a blogger.

None of that seems all that interesting any longer, because I can reliably report that Clayton Kershaw is going to sign an eight-year, $200m extension with the Dodgers, possibly as soon as tonight. If so, that would blow away all of us — myself included — who thought that $200m was an unattainable goal, though clearly deals since then have impacted that.

No word yet on the structure of the deal, but if it begins in 2013, as I expect it would, then it would cover Kershaw’s age 25-32 seasons. It’s a ludicrous amount of money, but that is exactly the timeframe I want a pitcher, and Kershaw’s obviously the kind of pitcher (and person) you’d want to lock up for that.

It’s not official yet, but I expect it to be in the next 24-48 hours, if not sooner. Much more to come, no doubt.

Most of us speculated that the sky was the limit on his extension, but $200 million warranted skepticism unless they were extending him for a decade. Well, never underestimate the unlimited bank account, I suppose, as $25 million annually is now expected to be a reality.

How the value of this and what not shakes out depends on the details, so I’ll wait to analyze that, but locking up an elite starter through his age 25-32 seasons is hard to complain about. Additionally, given the inflating market, it’s hard to find a realistic alternative to this.

Opening Day for the Dodgers is Monday, and since Spring Training feels like it has taken forever, it’s about damn time. Given the closeness of the start of the season though, it’s a bit odd that there are so many question marks as to what will happen with the roster.

Every team has to deal with decisions on the 24th and 25th man, but it’s rare that a team with World Series hopes is still deciding on the rotation and the left side of the starting infield. Since the team’s starting SS is out for two months and there’s a surplus with eight starting pitchers, it’s anybody’s guess as to how it all shakes out.

Personally though, I have to figure the Opening Day 25-man roster looks something like what you see below.

—–

Starting Lineup

C – A.J. Ellis
1B – Adrian Gonzalez
2B – Mark Ellis
3B – Jerry Hairston Jr.
SS – Luis Cruz
LF – Carl Crawford
CF – Matt Kemp
RF – Andre Ethier

SS – Luis Cruz is a relatively easy choice for me at this spot. He plays solid defense at the position and is the best option available at the moment.

Yes, I’ve read the recent chatter about Justin Sellers getting this spot, which I suppose is possible. However, realistically I can only see that happening if they release Juan Uribe, or they trade both Aaron Harang and Chris Capuano AND go with 11 pitchers, or they roll with no real backup outfielder (Jerry Hairston Jr./Skip Schumaker).

My experience with Ned Colletti and Dodgers roster decision-making has led me to always go with the player who has experience, who is being paid by the team, and who is currently on the 40-man roster. Thus, no Sellers for me.

3B – Jerry Hairston Jr. and Skip Schumaker should platoon here. Hairston doesn’t actually have much of a split (.712 LHP/.694 RHP), but Schumaker does (.762 RHP/.521 LHP). If Don Mattingly plays his cards right here, there an off-chance the Dodgers don’t actually lose much except upside for the two months Hanley’s out, primarily because he plays terrible defense.

The alternative of Sellers’ .607 career MLB OPS, or his ~.700 career MILB OPS outside of the moon base in Albuquerque, is not appealing at all in lieu of an option like this. That logic HAS to win out, right? RIGHT?!

LF – Carl Crawford certainly looks on pace even though his already weak throwing arm looks pathetic right now. Still, he’s swinging a bat and nothing is wrong with his legs, so I can’t see him starting the year on the DL.

—–

Bench

B – Tim Federowicz
B – Nick Punto
B – Skip Schumaker
B – Juan Uribe
B – Alex Castellanos

DL – Hanley Ramirez

IF Bench – The trio of Nick Punto, Schumaker, and Uribe meet Colletti’s three standards, as reviewed above, so they’re basically locks to me. Tim Federowicz makes the team because they cut every other catcher in camp except Matt Wallach, and he’s not making the roster.

OF Bench – Why Alex Castellanos, right? Why over Elian Herrera and Alfredo Amezaga? Amezaga is simple, as he’s not on the 40-man. Herrera, who I don’t think is a quality player anyway, doesn’t provide the potential pop off the bench the Dodgers SORELY lack at the moment. Not putting Castellanos on the bench means the Dodgers would have four hitters with no power … and Uribe, who can’t hit at all.

—–

Starting Rotation

1 – Clayton Kershaw
2 – Zack Greinke
3 – Josh Beckett
4 – Chad Billingsley
5 – Hyun Jin Ryu

The order is jumbled because of injury and what not, but this is what was projected at the end of the off-season, and while it’s been an adventure to get here, it’s basically worked out how it was supposed to.

That said, given the way the schedule looks, it’s possible that Chad Billingsley or Zack Greinke could be put on the DL and have their turn skipped a couple times while they work into shape (Greinke) or recover from injury (Billingsley). Either way though, that would only buy the team 10 games or so to do something before a roster decision would be forced.

—–

Bullpen

CL – Brandon League
ST – Kenley Jansen
RP – Ronald Belisario
RP – J.P Howell
RP – Matt Guerrier
RP – Kevin Gregg
RP – Aaron Harang

DL – Scott Elbert
DL – Ted Lilly

Lefty Reliever – Sorry Paco Rodriguez, you might be better than two, three, or even four pitchers in the bullpen, but you have options, so bye bye.

Veteran Reliever – Kevin Gregg has a 0.87 ERA over 10.1 IP this spring, while Peter Moylan is at a 7.56 ERA in 8.1 IP. Colletti must have a NRI veteran reliever on the team, so it is Gregg. Plus, he has closing experience, which automatically makes him the best!

Starter Turned Reliever – Ted Lilly has to end up on the DL because he looks fucking terrible. Don’t whine to me about language. It is what it is.

What happened to Chris Capuano? I think he gets traded and soon. I picked him to get dealt over Aaron Harang because he’s a better pitcher and more valuable to teams. That said, there’s an extremely compelling case for Capuano to be in the pen over Harang. It consists of Capuano saying that he can come out of the pen, while Mattingly said he sees Harang as a starter only. I get that, but unless the Dodgers want to get nothing in return, I can’t see why a team would settle for Harang when they could have Capuano, especially given their handedness.

Either way, I’m confident something of significance happens with a trade, because if not, I’m unsure how the pen would shake out unless they carry 13 pitchers. As mentioned earlier, an option would be putting Bills or Greinke on the DL, but that’s a stop-gap solution at best. I suppose Gregg could be let go, but we all know that would burn Ned’s soul, so I figure one of the two healthy excess starters won’t be a Dodger for long.

—–

Now we just wait for the announcement that Harang has been traded, Gregg has been cut, and Sellers will start at SS because … of course it would happen.

Baseball fans love to talk about clutch plays and clutch players, and Dodgers fans are no exception, but like with a pitcher’s best and worst pitches, there tends to be a lack of evidence presented. As such, I decided to find some basis for clutch plays and clutch players, courtesy of the WPA and Clutch statistics.

WPA

Most sabermetric statistics are context neutral — they do not consider the situation of a particular event or how some plays are more crucial to a win than others. While wOBA rates all home runs as equal, we know intuitively that a home run in the third inning of a blowout is less important to that win than a home run in the bottom of the ninth inning of a close game. Win Probability Added (WPA) captures this difference by measuring how individual players affect their team’s win expectancy on a per-play basis.

Clutch

In the words of David Appelman, this calculation measures, “…how much better or worse a player does in high leverage situations than he would have done in a context neutral environment.” It also compares a player against himself, so a player who hits .300 in high leverage situations when he’s an overall .300 hitter is not considered clutch.

So that’s the foundation for this post, and since that’s now been established, let’s get on with it, shall we?

As always, visuals have been provided because, let’s be honest, everything is better with visuals.

—–

I feel like it’s necessary to point out that none of this is predictive of the future or telling of the past. It’s a post about stuff that happened in 2012. That’s all.

In other words, please don’t link back to this while saying, “LOOK! THIS DUDE IS SUCH A CHOKER, BRO!” No.

—–

Top Five David Carradine Choke Pitches Of 2012

1. Kenley Jansen – -65.2%

Still amuses me that the umpire called the first runner out initially.

Anyway, so technically this wasn’t a pitch, but … uh … it was one of the most ridiculous ways to allow two runs I have ever seen.

It was the ninth inning and there were runners on second and third with two down. The Dodgers were clinging to a one-run lead, so it’s not like they weren’t in trouble since a hit would have had a similar result, but this was certainly more creative.

2. Javy Guerra – -64.8%

Two-run walk-off doubles tend to result in being on this list.

3. Kenley Jansen – -45.2%

Giving up a two-run single with a one-run lead in the top of eighth is not good, but it would have been worse had Matt Kemp not gunned a runner down at third.

Oh, and it was Hunter Pence who did the damage, thus making it ten times worse.

4. Javy Guerra – -44.5%

Deja vu.

5. Javy Guerra – -43.7%

Remember when people scoffed at the notion that Kenley Jansen was the better reliever? Oops.

To be fair, this was the game where he got his face destroyed, which seems like a legit excuse for giving up a game-tying one-run single.

—–

Kenley Jansen might be an idiot, but boy did the closer role not suit Javy Guerra.

—–

Top Five Chokeiest Dodgers Of 2012 – Ball Thrower Division

1. Javy Guerra – -1.44
2. Joe Blanton – -0.43
3. Chad Billingsley – -0.36
4. Clayton Kershaw – -0.25
5. Kenley Jansen – -0.23

Baseball fans love to talk about clutch plays and clutch players, and Dodgers fans are no exception, but like with a pitcher’s best and worst pitches, there tends to be a lack of evidence presented. As such, I decided to find some basis for clutch plays and clutch players, courtesy of the WPA and Clutch statistics.

WPA

Most sabermetric statistics are context neutral — they do not consider the situation of a particular event or how some plays are more crucial to a win than others. While wOBA rates all home runs as equal, we know intuitively that a home run in the third inning of a blowout is less important to that win than a home run in the bottom of the ninth inning of a close game. Win Probability Added (WPA) captures this difference by measuring how individual players affect their team’s win expectancy on a per-play basis.

Clutch

In the words of David Appelman, this calculation measures, “…how much better or worse a player does in high leverage situations than he would have done in a context neutral environment.” It also compares a player against himself, so a player who hits .300 in high leverage situations when he’s an overall .300 hitter is not considered clutch.

So that’s the foundation for this post, and since that’s now been established, let’s get on with it, shall we?

As always, visuals have been provided because, let’s be honest, everything is better with visuals.

—–

I feel like it’s necessary to point out that none of this is predictive of the future or telling of the past. It’s a post about stuff that happened in 2012. That’s all.

In other words, please don’t link back to this while saying, “LOOK! THIS DUDE IS SUCH A CHOKER, BRO!” No.

—–

Top Five David Carradine Choke Jobs Of 2012

1. Andre Ethier – -39.3%

Horrifying.

With the bases loaded and one down in the bottom of the eighth, and the Dodgers trailing the rival Giants 2-1, Andre Ethier comes up and … yeah.

…

2. Jerry Hairston Jr. – -34.1%

Nobody out in the bottom of the ninth and trailing by a run, Jerry Hairston Jr. decides it’s a sweet time to ground into a double play while there’s runners on first and second, thus killing a massive opportunity.

3. Adam Kennedy – -33.6%

Second and third and one out in the bottom of the ninth and trailing by one run, Adam Kennedy did what he did best in 2012: rolling over and chopping a ball to the right side.

Extra scorn for almost killing Matt Kemp.

4. Tony Gwynn Jr. – -29.1%

Just looking.

Down by a run in the bottom of the ninth with runners on second and third, Tony Gwynn Jr. needed to put the ball in play and give himself a chance. Instead, he did his best impersonation of a statue.

5. Mark Ellis – -25.7%

Bottom of the tenth and trailing by a run, the Dodgers put men on first and third with one out, but Mark Ellis … did that.

Bonus anger for doing it against Jonathan Papelbon.

—–

Commentary? So much fail.

—–

Top Five Chokeiest Dodgers Of 2012 – Field Player Division

1. A.J. Ellis – -1.62
2. Adam Kennedy – -1.14
3. Andre Ethier – -1.01
4. Jerry Hairston Jr. – -0.95
5. Shane Victorino – -0.37

Baseball fans love to talk about clutch plays and clutch players, and Dodgers fans are no exception, but like with a pitcher’s best and worst pitches, there tends to be a lack of evidence presented. As such, I decided to find some basis for clutch plays and clutch players, courtesy of the WPA and Clutch statistics.

WPA

Most sabermetric statistics are context neutral — they do not consider the situation of a particular event or how some plays are more crucial to a win than others. While wOBA rates all home runs as equal, we know intuitively that a home run in the third inning of a blowout is less important to that win than a home run in the bottom of the ninth inning of a close game. Win Probability Added (WPA) captures this difference by measuring how individual players affect their team’s win expectancy on a per-play basis.

Clutch

In the words of David Appelman, this calculation measures, “…how much better or worse a player does in high leverage situations than he would have done in a context neutral environment.” It also compares a player against himself, so a player who hits .300 in high leverage situations when he’s an overall .300 hitter is not considered clutch.

So that’s the foundation for this post, and since that’s now been established, let’s get on with it, shall we?

As always, visuals have been provided because, let’s be honest, everything is better with visuals.

—–

I feel like it’s necessary to point out that none of this is predictive of the future or telling of the past. It’s a post about stuff that happened in 2012. That’s all.

In other words, please don’t link back to this while saying, “LOOK! THIS DUDE IS SO CLUTCH, BRO!” No.

—–

Top Five Clutchiest McClutchington Outs Of 2012

1. Kenley Jansen – 46.8%

The Dodgers were clinging onto an 8-7 lead with one down in the bottom of the ninth and runners on first and third. At this point, you’d almost be happy with a tied game.

One Jason Kubel swing later and it was a win instead.

2. Javy Guerra – 31.6%

Tied at 4-4 in the top of the ninth inning, the Padres got runners on first and second with nobody out. Not looking good for the Dodgers.

But then the impossible happened and … well … you can see it for yourself.

3. Ronald Belisario – 27.5%

Tied at two in the bottom of the eighth inning and facing a bases loaded jam with one out, Ronald Belisario gets out of it thanks to what basically amounts to luck.

Matt Holliday smashed a liner, but it was right at Mark Ellis, who doubled up the runner at second.

4. Kenley Jansen – 24.7%

With runners on second and third in the top of the ninth and one down, the Dodgers are clinging to a 6-5 lead when Kenley Jansen induces a harmless infield pop-up.

5. Brandon League – 20.0%

Tied at three with one down in the bottom of the tenth and a runner on third, Brandon League keeps him there by inducing a strikeout.

—–

It shouldn’t be a surprise to anybody that the most clutch plays of the season all went to relievers.

That said, I am shocked that Javy Guerra‘s play wasn’t tops on this list, since it’s almost never that you induce three outs on one pitch.

—–

Top Five Clutchiest Dodgers Of 2012 – Ball Thrower Division

1. Brandon League – 0.70
2. Josh Lindblom – 0.47
3. Nate Eovaldi – 0.34
4. Shawn Tolleson – 0.34
5. Stephen Fife – 0.32

Baseball fans love to talk about clutch plays and clutch players, and Dodgers fans are no exception, but like with a pitcher’s best and worst pitches, there tends to be a lack of evidence presented. As such, I decided to find some basis for clutch plays and clutch players, courtesy of the WPA and Clutch statistics.

WPA

Most sabermetric statistics are context neutral — they do not consider the situation of a particular event or how some plays are more crucial to a win than others. While wOBA rates all home runs as equal, we know intuitively that a home run in the third inning of a blowout is less important to that win than a home run in the bottom of the ninth inning of a close game. Win Probability Added (WPA) captures this difference by measuring how individual players affect their team’s win expectancy on a per-play basis.

Clutch

In the words of David Appelman, this calculation measures, “…how much better or worse a player does in high leverage situations than he would have done in a context neutral environment.” It also compares a player against himself, so a player who hits .300 in high leverage situations when he’s an overall .300 hitter is not considered clutch.

So that’s the foundation for this post, and since that’s now been established, let’s get on with it, shall we?

As always, visuals have been provided because, let’s be honest, everything is better with visuals.

—–

I feel like it’s necessary to point out that none of this is predictive of the future or telling of the past. It’s a post about stuff that happened in 2012. That’s all.

In other words, please don’t link back to this while saying, “LOOK! THIS DUDE IS SO CLUTCH, BRO!” No.

—–

Top Five Clutchiest McClutchington Hits Of 2012

1. Adrian Gonzalez – +69.9%

Whenever you increase your team’s chances of winning by 69.9% with one swing of the bat, something must have gone right.

Well, it did.

It was the bottom of the ninth with one out and runners on first and second. The Dodgers trailed the Diamondbacks by a score of 4-3.

Down to his last strike, A-Gon comes up gigantic with a walk-off double down the right field line off J.J. Putz.

2. Ivan De Jesus – 67.3%

THANK YOU J.J. PUTZ XOXOXO HUGS AND KISSES

Trailing 7-6 with runners on first and second and down to their last out, feeble hitting Ivan De Jesus came up and whacked a double over Chris Young‘s head in center to take the lead.

Much love to J.J. Putz.

3. Scott Van Slyke – 61.1%

Early in 2012, the season was full of “yeah, this team is winning the World Series if this kinda shit happens” moments, and this was certainly one of them.

Scott Van Slyke hit a three-run bomb with runners on first and second to give the Dodgers a 6-5 lead after they trailed 5-3 with two outs in the bottom of the seventh inning.

Even though it was only the seventh, it felt like a gigantic moment, right? WPA agrees.

4. Elian Herrera – 51.6%

So it’s the top of the eighth with two outs, the Dodgers trail 1-0 and Cliff Lee is just absolutely taking a dump down their throats, and, I mean, there’s runners on first and second but Elian Herrera or whoever is up, so it’s inning ove … HOLY SHIT! YES!!!

Shoutout to Juan Pierre.

5. Luis Cruz – 50.7%

Bottom of the sixth, two outs, runners on first and second (this is a theme), Dodgers trail the Cardinals 4-3, but 2012 phenom Luis Cruz is up and he absolutely bombs one into the bullpen to put the Dodgers up by two.

Bonus points for pimping it.

—–

Overall, the fact that there are five different players contributing here, and that four of the five are still basically unknowns to casual fans, speaks to how remarkable it was that the 2012 Dodgers even stayed in the playoff hunt throughout all the injuries and what not.

—–

Top Five Clutchiest Dodgers Of 2012 – Field Player Division

1. Dee Gordon – 1.05
2. Elian Herrera – 0.93
3. Luis Cruz – 0.84
4. Juan Uribe – 0.77
5. Adrian Gonzalez – 0.72

Andre Ethier is growing rather sick and tired of questions regarding his inability to hit left-handed pitchers and whether or not he’s going to be platooned, and he recently stated that the difference between people nagging him about it and not is an extra five hits a year.

It was only one at-bat, and it was only spring training. But it was Andre Ethier’s first at-bat of spring training against a left-handed pitcher, so naturally it commanded a lot of attention.

Ethier stroked an opposite-field triple in the fourth inning Saturday against Chicago White Sox southpaw Leyson Septimo. He finished the exhibition opener 1-for-2, and after the game cautioned against making too much out of a small sample size.

“(If I) get five extra hits in the year, you guys aren’t going to talk to me about it,” Ethier said. “It’s that simple.”

Well … yeah, that would help, but it’s not like five hits a year in this context is a minor improvement or a tiny adjustment or something.

Over his seven-year career, Ethier has had 1010 at-bats against southpaws, which is about 144 per year. So he’s asking for five hits per 144 at-bats, which is ridiculous.

To put that into perspective, the much-maligned James Loney has 3170 at-bats over the exact same seven years. Giving him five hits for every 144 at-bats results in 110 additional hits, and his career batting average jumps from .282 to .317 and his career OPS goes from .758 to around .830. That turns him from a punch-line into an above-average regular.

Keep that fact in mind going forward, because even giving Ethier the free hits he thinks would help him avoid criticism, I don’t think it would help as much as he thinks. Add 35 hits to his numbers against lefties over those seven years and you get a career line that goes from .238/.296/.352/.649 to .272/.328/.389/.717, which isn’t exactly stellar considering the league-average OPS from 2006 to 2012 was .743.

Point being, his batting average would be solid enough, but that doesn’t address the walk rate (10.8%/6.2%), strikeout rate (15.3%/21.4%), nor power (.215 ISO/.115 ISO). So even granting him five hits against lefties every year, which is just silly, I’m gonna guess people would still ask questions about a ~.200 OPS difference in split. Like fans/media wouldn’t ask why he goes from Josh Hamilton to Juan Uribe based on the handedness of the pitcher?

Look, I can imagine it’s frustrating for Ethier to hear the same questions over and over again, and I get that it’s not his fault that Don Mattingly and friends refuse to platoon him. However, for $85 million, people tend to want more than a guy who just crushes righties, and the reality for now is that he’s an excellent platoon guy masquerading as an everyday regular, five annually gifted hits or not.

Dodgers starter Josh Beckett is one of many high-risk, high-reward types of players coming into 2013, and at the time of his acquisition, he was seen as somewhat of a throw-in. This was partially because of his contract, but the fact is that both the statistics and the scouting reports matched up to say that he looked more like a #5 than a #1.

The velocity he once had (as high as 94.7 mph in 2006) is now generally gone (91.4 mph in 2012), so my primary concern was whether or not he was going to be able to adjust to not having his go-to gas anymore. Given his reputation as a hard-head in Boston, the fact that he gained a reputation for pumping fastball after fastball into the strike zone (as high as 69%/top 5 in MLB), and that his fastball performed so miserably in 2012, I had my doubts about whether he was even willing to adjust, much less able to make the transition successful.

However, recently during Spring Training, he acknowledged his loss of velocity and that he’s been working on adjusting to his new reality.

Instead, as Beckett has learned in recent years, he must do things differently. His velocity has declined, so he’s throwing more cutters and curveballs, fretting more about location than at any point before.

“I think velocity is something that leaves you at some point in your career,” Beckett said. “It’s a game of adjustments anyway. We all have to make ‘em. I think I have to rely more on location instead of trying to throw it through a wall. That’s something where you have to set your ego aside. You still have the same mentality. You go about it the same way. But there are certain times where you think, ‘I’m going to throw this ball by this guy.’ Then you think, ‘Wait a minute, I can’t do that. All right, I’m going to throw the ball off the corner and have it work just off the corner.’”

I found this interesting because: 1) he specifically mentioned putting ego aside to do the right thing for success and 2) he seemed aware that some type of adjustments were necessary, which made me take a look at his past pitch distribution.

*Click To Enlarge*

Basically, how he attacks hitters has been a work in progress since at least 2010, which is when his fastball usage came down to about league average. Granted, that’s not all positive, as he’s had up and down results in spite of his efforts, posting FIPs of 3.63, 4.54, 3.57, and 4.15 over the last four years.

The promising thing though is that I don’t think getting him to mix pitches will be as significant of a task as I originally thought, because it’s clear he has already bought in. Thus, if he can stave off further fastball regression, and given the success of his curve in 2012, I feel a lot more comfortable with him potentially achieving his #3 upside, or at least remaining a solid rotation piece, either of which is what the team really needs due to the ticking time bomb in Chad Billingsley‘s right elbow.

The 2013 projection for the Dodgers from Dan Szymborski‘s ZiPS system was released last week, and given that it’s probably my favorite forecasting tool, it’s worth a look to see how the team fared.

Forecasting is not a complete science, obviously, and I’ll address some of the potential pitfalls as we go along, but it’s better to use objective tools like these than the hopes/dreams of fans or the bitterness/wishes of haters.

To start us off, how does the team fare, generally speaking? A solid playoff contender, for sure, but a super team? Doesn’t seem likely.

—–

The Field Players

Despite all the hype over the recent acquisitions, the key cogs in this machine are still Clayton Kershaw and Matt Kemp. It’s a promising sign then, that Kemp projects at a 144 OPS+ and the system has confidence in him continuing to put up offensive numbers in the ~.900 OPS range. His defense in center still lags below average, but his bat more than makes up for it. His playing time projection has dropped due to his injury woes last season, and quite frankly, it’s hard to fault it for that. Regardless, he still figures to be the most valuable field player on the team.

Adrian Gonzalez is slated to be another bright spot, as ZiPS pegs him to bounceback a bit, though not as much as some want, clocking in at an ~.830 OPS/128 OPS+. That would still be his lowest OPS+ since 2008 (besides 2012, of course), but it’s a marked improvement considering his age and negatively trending skills. A-Gon compensates for that lagging bat a bit by putting up plus defense almost worth a win by itself. Hanley Ramirez factors in as yet another bounceback candidate, projecting at a 115 OPS+, which is an upgrade over last year’s 106 and is closer to his pre-2011 production. Defensively, even his horribad -8 run defensive rating is optimistic to me, as he was truly terrible with the glove last year. Given that I already wanted to barf seeing him trying to turn a double play in 2012, I wouldn’t be surprised at all to see him put up horrid defensive numbers after basically not playing the position all of spring.

Unfortunately, that’s where a lot of the offensive optimism ends. Luis Cruz checks in at 84 OPS+ (106 last year), which will anger many fans, but is completely reasonable given the track record. He remains valuable through plus defense, though given the sample size, there’s reason to be skeptical there as well. A.J. Ellis at 96 OPS+ (118) is another depressing but completely logical projection, as evidenced by everybody’s surprise in 2012 at his potent bat. Andre Ethier at 112 OPS+ (123) is hard to figure for me, because he has been consistently putting up ~120 OPS+ seasons even if it has come down from the ~130 OPS+ range two years ago. I suppose the projection system thinks he’ll get old in a hurry … or maybe it just thinks he’ll face an inordinately high amount of lefties. Mark Ellis at 81 OPS+ (93) shouldn’t be much of a surprise considering he’s 36 and put up an 80 OPS+ at Coors Field in 2011.

The last guy of the starters is Carl Crawford, who is the enigma of the 2013 season. He checks in at 104, which is notable because it’s basically his career OPS+ and it’s about what he did in limited time in 2012 over in Boston. That’s of particular note for me, because what he did in Boston in 2012 can be attributed to a mechanical fix that I pointed out in an article for Baseball Prospectus. Understandably, his playing time checks in low, but if he can produce like he did in 2012 but over a whole season, the Dodgers will be much better for it.

Overall, after fixing the playing time of A.J., adjusting Ethier’s offense up a bit, and adjusting Hanley’s defense down a bit, the starting lineup totaled about 22 WAR.

—–

The Bench & The Prospects

Assuming a bench of Tim Federowicz, Scott Van Slyke or Alex Castellanos, Jerry Hairston Jr., Nick Punto, and Skip Schumaker, we’re looking at around 3 WAR here after playing time is adjusted back to realistic bench levels. I’m guessing Alfredo Amezaga or Tony Gwynn Jr. work their way in somehow, but a five-man bench seems likely initially if the Dodgers can’t deal multiple pitchers before the season starts. Neither player would affect the WAR projection much though.

Honestly? I have to hope the Dodgers do something to improve the bench, because the current configuration looks rather mediocre, and the other options are keeping Juan Uribe and/or Elian Herrera. Yuck.

The good news is that Joc Pederson, T-Fed, SVS, and Castle are projected to be solid at the MLB level, though it sees Dee Gordon basically languishing behind.

—–

The Rotation

Clayton Kershaw is simply a beast, and he figures to check in with a 75 FIP-. This might seem high considering his 2011 and 2012 ERA- figures of 63 and 67, respectively, but when you consider that Felix Hernandez clocks in at 78 FIP- for 2013, you get the picture.

What might surprise is how close new acquisition Zack Greinke comes in behind him, as he figures to put up an FIP- of 81. Granted, he has always projected favorably, as his career FIP- is 80, while his career ERA- is 88, but even adjusting slightly for that, there’s a definite case there for the best 1-2 punch in the majors.

Unfortunately, this is where it gets murky, as Chad Billingsley has the stuff to be the #3, but if I were a betting man, I would bet his elbow implodes before July. He projects at 92 FIP-, which would put him around last year’s performance, which was his arguably his best season since 2008. However, given the nature of his injury and its history in the league, you can basically never rely on him to stay healthy again until he has Tommy John surgery.

Next in the pecking order are Josh Beckett, who comes in below-average at 103, and foreign import Hyun Jin Ryu, who comes in well below-average at 116. As mentioned before, the scouting reports for Beckett match this projection, as he’s no longer a front-line starter due to his decrease in velocity. However, if he can manage to learn to pitch a bit more, he still has the curve to perhaps slot in as a #3 more than a #4. Ryu is a case where I would take any projection with a mound of salt, because there’s hardly anything to base objective projections on. Personally, I don’t think Ryu has the stuff to be a #2, nor do I think he’ll be a #3 on a team with a $250 million payroll, but he should slot in comfortably in the back-end of the rotation for years. I would project something slightly below-average for 2013 and then hope for better.

The rotation is a strong point because it has both arguably the best 1-2 punch in the majors and depth, with Chris Capuano (108 FIP-) and Aaron Harang (114 FIP) presumably traded for upgrades (or maybe kept somehow?), and it checks in at about 17 WAR.

—–

The Bullpen & The Prospects

As of right now, I’m assuming a bullpen of Brandon League, Kenley Jansen, Ronald Belisario, Javy Guerra, Matt Guerrier, J.P. Howell, and Ted Lilly.

Jansen is the best of the bunch (63 FIP-) and League projects a distant second (92 FIP-), but Belisario has the most upside in these projections (101 FIP-). After that, Guerra, Guerrier, and Howell are all around replacement level. Lilly projects as a league-average pitcher, assuming he’s healthy, which would be a boon to a team that has a ticking time bomb in the rotation.

As far as prospects go, ZiPS thinks Chris Reed could be a replacement-level fill-in right now, but Zach Lee, Matt Magill, and Garrett Gould need more seasoning. And for all of you who have Stephen Fife wet dreams (yes, you’re out there), he projects at a 4.91 FIP, so keep it in your pants.

Speaking of replacement level, that especially applies to the Dodgers bullpen because of Shawn Tolleson, Scott Elbert, Steven Ames, and Paco Rodriguez, so the 4 WAR projection for this pen figures to be solid.

—–

Team Projection

A replacement-level team figures to win 43 games, and the team with the lowest amount of wins to get into the playoffs last year was the Cardinals at 88 wins, so 42 WAR puts you in the contender range and 45 WAR makes you viable, while 50 WAR will generally make a team a safe bet to be in the postseason. The Dodgers total 46 WAR, which puts them well within the playoff hunt: good but not great.

The Dodgers basically project neck-and-neck with the rival Giants, while the D-Backs lag behind a bit by maybe a half dozen wins or so, but they’re well within striking distance as well.

So make no mistake, the Dodgers recent spending habits did not make them an elite team, as the money simply duct-taped over both a flawed team and farm system depleted by Frank McCourt‘s ownership and Ned Colletti‘s questionable decisions. But that’s not to denigrate the job the new owners have done, as they turned the franchise into a legitimate playoff contender seemingly overnight, which is still saying a lot about what money can do.

Granted, “we gave you a team that has the chance to make the playoffs” is not what fans want to hear, but it’s an acceptable scenario as they lay the foundation to rebuild the franchise the correct way in their own minds. The 2013 projections might not reflect world-beaters like most seem to expect, but it’s a projection based on historical trends rather than hopes and dreams.

The 2013 Dodgers are indeed a team with a lot of upside, and if everything breaks correctly, they could very well end up being one of the best teams in the league, but they also carry a ton of inherent age and injury risk, which is why the projections come in understandably conservative. Either way, if nothing else, this team figures to be never boring.

As fans of the Dodgers, we’re always analyzing which pitchers have the best and worst pitches, but we normally base that on nothing but our own feelings at the moment, so I decided to take a more objective look at things.

For a pitch to qualify for these rankings, I used a 200-pitch minimum for starters and a 50-pitch minimum for relievers. The metric used to measure pitch effectiveness is True Average (TAv), which is basically like wOBA. League average performance is set at .260, and the metric doesn’t include baserunning.

Additionally, to prevent the post from being solely numbers-based, and one that would have been mind-numbingly boring, I decided to provide visual evidence as well.

—–

Worst Overall Pitches

Shawn Tolleson – Sinker – .395 TAv

Mike MacDougal – Sinker – .342 TAv

Matt Guerrier – Fastball – .320 TAv

Relief pitchers have smaller sample sizes, so they are prone to fluctuations, but they have the advantage of appearing in short bursts and limiting their arsenal to only their best pitches.

So … uh … this is TERRIBLE.

.395 is like 40 points higher than Mike Trout in 2012 for fucks sake.

H-h-how?

—–

Worst Individual Pitches

Fastball

Matt Guerrier – .320 TAv

*Visual Is Above*

Shawn Tolleson – .273
Javy Guerra – .256
Scott Elbert – .237
Ronald Belisario – .082

Ugh.

Sinker

Shawn Tolleson – .395 TAv

*Visual Is Above*

Mike MacDougal – .342
Brandon League – .280
Todd Coffey – .263
Randy Choate – .262
Jamey Wright – .258
Ronald Belisario – .225

No … just no.

Cutter

Jamey Wright – .258 TAv

Scott Elbert – .242
Javy Guerra – .208
Kenley Jansen – .187
Matt Guerrier – .139

Curve

Javy Guerra – .271 TAv

Jamey Wright – .171

Finishing last out of two isn’t bad, but giving up a .271 on a curve as a reliever is.

Slider

Kenley Jansen – .236 TAv

Jamey Wright – .215
Todd Coffey – .214
Shawn Tolleson – .206
Brandon League – .147
Ronald Belisario – .121
Randy Choate – .058

I actually think he could benefit from throwing this more often because it’s a quality pitch. Not hanging it is a different story, but how is he supposed to learn command of it if he never uses it?

Change

None Qualified

Splitter

Brandon League – .096 TAv

He’s the only reliever that qualified for this pitch, so I guess he’s technically the best and the worst, but considering his split was the second-most effective pitch by a reliever for the team in 2012, I’m pretty sure he gets a pass.

As fans of the Dodgers, we’re always analyzing which pitchers have the best and worst pitches, but we normally base that on nothing but our own feelings at the moment, so I decided to take a more objective look at things.

For a pitch to qualify for these rankings, I used a 200-pitch minimum for starters and a 50-pitch minimum for relievers. The metric used to measure pitch effectiveness is True Average (TAv), which is basically like wOBA. League average performance is set at .260, and the metric doesn’t include baserunning.

Additionally, to prevent the post from being solely numbers-based, and one that would have been mind-numbingly boring, I decided to provide visual evidence as well.

—–

Worst Overall Pitches

Chad Billingsley – Cutter – .336 TAv

Josh Beckett – Fastball – .307 TAv

Aaron Harang – Sinker – .307 TAv

Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the dumpster fire.

HOLY SHIT CHAD BILLINGSLEY STOP THROWING THAT PITCH

For the most part, he did abandon it in 2012, but apparently not enough. And honestly, it’s hard to tell when he was trying to throw a cutter or a slider because they both sucked and his separation between the pitches was inconsistent (protip: that is bad).

Also, there was a time when the fastballs of Josh Beckett and Aaron Harang (seriously, he posted 5 WAR seasons throwing it like 70% of the time) were feared. Not anymore.

—–

Worst Individual Pitches

Fastball

Josh Beckett – .307 TAv

*Visual Is Above*

Chris Capuano – .297
Joe Blanton – .268
Aaron Harang – .256
Clayton Kershaw – .253
Chad Billingsley – .241
Ted Lilly – .213

How far the mighty have fallen…

Sinker

Aaron Harang – .307 TAv

*Visual Is Above*

Joe Blanton – .295
Josh Beckett – .278
Chris Capuano – .272
Chad Billingsley – .232

To put this into perspective, by throwing it to a hitter, he basically turned everybody into Josh Hamilton.

Cutter

Chad Billingsley – .336 TAv

*Visual Is Above*

Josh Beckett – .282
Joe Blanton – .253

Curve

Chad Billingsley – .251 TAv

Aaron Harang – .240
Joe Blanton – .183
Josh Beckett – .183
Clayton Kershaw – .084

Slider

Chad Billingsley – .263 TAv

Joe Blanton – .250
Aaron Harang – .218
Clayton Kershaw – .213
Chris Capuano – .190

Stuff wise, I don’t actually think his off-speed pitches are bad. Location wise? Yeah, he hangs them a lot. A LOT.

Change

Joe Blanton – .264 TAv

Josh Beckett – .237
Chris Capuano – .211

It’s almost as if throwing a change with no movement or deception is a bad thing.

As fans of the Dodgers, we’re always analyzing which pitchers have the best and worst pitches, but we normally base that on nothing but our own feelings at the moment, so I decided to take a more objective look at things.

For a pitch to qualify for these rankings, I used a 200-pitch minimum for starters and a 50-pitch minimum for relievers. The metric used to measure pitch effectiveness is True Average (TAv), which is basically like wOBA. League average performance is set at .260, and the metric doesn’t include baserunning.

Additionally, to prevent the post from being solely numbers-based, and one that would have been mind-numbingly boring, I decided to provide visual evidence as well.

—–

Best Overall Pitches

Randy Choate – Slider – .058 TAv

Brandon League – Splitter – .096 TAv

Ronald Belisario – Slider – .121 TAv

The first two pitches should come as no surprise given that they are basically what both pitchers make their money off of. However, Ronald Belisario’s slider? Really? Yeah, but I’m guessing that’s almost entirely based on how surprised hitters are to see it when they’re expecting nothing but 95-97 mph sinking fastballs.

—–

Best Individual Pitches

Fastball

Scott Elbert – .237 TAv

Javy Guerra – .256
Shawn Tolleson – .273
Matt Guerrier – .320

Ronald Belisario’s .082 was disqualified because I’m about 99% sure these pitches were simply identified incorrectly. In any case, I’m surprised by how the Dodgers have zero fireballing fastball relievers.

Sinker

Ronald Belisario – .225 TAv

Jamey Wright – .258
Randy Choate – .262
Todd Coffey – .263
Brandon League – .280
Mike MacDougal – .342
Shawn Tolleson – .395

To have everybody know the pitch is coming and to still beat hitters with it is amazing.

Cutter

Kenley Jansen – .187 TAv

Javy Guerra – .208
Scott Elbert – .242
Jamey Wright – .258

Matt Guerrier actually had a .139, but he barely met the minimum and Kenley Jansen’s cutter is his main pitch and was still below .200, which is silly. Also, I’m biased and wanted to show that GIF. Deal with it.

Curve

Jamey Wright – .171 TAv

Javy Guerra – .271

Slider

Randy Choate – .058 TAv

*Visual Is Above*

Ronald Belisario – .121
Brandon League – .147
Shawn Tolleson – .206
Todd Coffey – .214
Jamey Wright – .215
Kenley Jansen – .236

Unfair to lefties, really.

Change

None Qualified

Splitter

Brandon League – .096 TAv

*Visual Is Above*

When he has got his command working, it’s a filthy, filthy pitch.

As fans of the Dodgers, we’re always analyzing which pitchers have the best and worst pitches, but we normally base that on nothing but our own feelings at the moment, so I decided to take a more objective look at things.

For a pitch to qualify for these rankings, I used a 200-pitch minimum for starters and a 50-pitch minimum for relievers. The metric used to measure pitch effectiveness is True Average (TAv), which is basically like wOBA. League average performance is set at .260, and the metric doesn’t include baserunning.

Additionally, to prevent the post from being solely numbers-based, and one that would have been mind-numbingly boring, I decided to provide visual evidence as well.

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Best Overall Pitches

Clayton Kershaw – Curve – .084 TAv

Josh Beckett – Curve – .183 TAv

Joe Blanton – Curve – .183 TAv

Am I surprised by the fact that the curve was the hardest pitch to do damage with? Yes and no. No, because it was bound to be an off-speed pitch, simply because fastballs are easier to command, thus they get thrown when a pitcher is behind in the count while the opposite is true for off-speed stuff. But yes, because I thought it would be the slider, which has basically become synonymous with swings and misses in recent times.

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Best Individual Pitches

Fastball

Ted Lilly – .213 TAv

Chad Billingsley – .241
Clayton Kershaw – .253
Aaron Harang – .256
Joe Blanton – .268
Chris Capuano – .297
Josh Beckett – .307

Is there a better example of the importance of pitch sequencing than this? Granted, it’s a small sample size because of his injury, but the fact that his fastball didn’t get blasted every single time he threw it is a testament to how he has to mix pitches to make his fastball seem harder to hit than it actually is.

Sinker

Chad Billingsley – .232 TAv

Chris Capuano – .272
Josh Beckett – .278
Joe Blanton – .295
Aaron Harang – .307

Annoyed by how I keep ranting on Twitter about how Chad Billingsley needs to throw his fastball more? Yeah, well he finally made the adjustment in 2012, but you should still get comfortable with hearing it, because he needs to continue to do that.

Cutter

Joe Blanton – .253 TAv

Josh Beckett – .282
Chad Billingsley – .336

Curve

Clayton Kershaw – .084 TAv

*Visual Is Above*

Josh Beckett – .183
Joe Blanton – .183
Aaron Harang – .240
Chad Billingsley – .251

Just stupid.

Slider

Chris Capuano – .190 TAv

Clayton Kershaw – .213
Aaron Harang – .218
Joe Blanton – .250
Chad Billingsley – .263

Change

Chris Capuano – .211 TAv

Josh Beckett – .237
Joe Blanton – .264

Chris Capuano is like the anti-Chad Billingsley. He has effective off-speed stuff, but oh boy does his fastball get blasted to high heaven. Really puts an exclamation mark on how he needs to get ahead in the count.